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HATE CRIMES: CRIMES OF MOrfiVE, 
CHARACTER, OR GROUP TERROR? 
PAUL H. ROBINSON 
ABSTRACT 
The primary objection of traditional criminal law theory to 
hate crimes is use of the actor's "motive" in defining the offense 
or the penalty enhancement. Motive, it is said, ought not be, and 
generally is not held to be, relevant to criminal liability. Hate 
crimes violate this rule by taking account of the actor's motive-
his or her anti-race, anti-religion, anti-sexual-preference, or other 
anti-group motive. 
I will argue that motive ought to be and commonly is, 
notwithstanding the claims to the contrary, an element in deter-
mining liability or grade of offense. What is objectionable, and 
what generally has been prohibited, is use of an actor 's character 
or general set of values as an element of liability or grading; but 
motive is not character. By keeping the law's focus only upon the 
character attributes relevant to the conduct constituting the of-
fense, motive in fact serves a useful role in reducing the tempta-
tion of liability inquiries to stray towards punishing general 
character. 
VVhile reliance upon motive may be consistent with tradi-
tional criminal law theory, it does not follow that motive is neces-
sarily the best criterion for defining the harms and evi ls that hate 
crimes seek to punish. Using an actor's bigoted motivation as a 
defining characteristic creates special difficulties in implementa-
tion and application, as well as dangers of infringing constitution-
ally protected speech or expressive conduct. One might conclude 
that, while traditional notions of criminal law theory would permit 
its use, hate motivation is best avoided as an offense or grading 
element, in favor of more objective factors present in such of-
fenses. A promising alternative is the criminalization of conduct 
that is intended to cause (or risk) intimidation or terror of an 
identifiable group. That alternative avoids the possibility of First 
Amendment problems and is consistent with mainstream criminai 
law theory by punishing an actor according to the extent of the 
harm caused, risked, or intended. 
Paul H. Robinson is Professor of Law, Northwestern University 
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INTRODUCTION 
In an effort to condemn and deter crimes motivated by ha-
tred and bigotry, many states have enacted new crimes or sen-
tencing enhancements that punish such crimes. Hate motivation 
for committing the crime may not always be an explicit element; 
the most common formulation, following the Anti-Defamation 
League ("ADL") model statute, punishes selection of a victim "by 
reason of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national 
origin, or sexual orientation" of the victim. 1 
Even in this form, however, the offense punishes or enhances 
punishment for the actor's motivation in selecting the victim-"by 
reason of. ... " Both formulations raise the question of whether 
reliance upon an actor's motivation is appropriate in the defini-
tion of a criminal offense. 
I 
MOTIVATION AS AN ELEMENT OF LIABILITY 
OR GRADING 
A common claim is that motive is not, and ought not be, rele-
vant to criminal liability or grading. 2 T he law cares about inten-
tion, not motive. But that does not seem consistent with existing 
criminal law. "Motive" has this dictionary definition: "something 
(as a need or desire) that causes a person to act." 3 T here is no 
reason to think that treatise writers or criminal code drafters 
would give it a different meaning. Yet criminal law is full of of-
fenses that have as elements a particular reason for acting, a need 
or desire that causes the person to act. Publicly exposing one's 
genitals with the purpose of gratifying one's sexual desire is indecent ex-
posure; breaking into a house with the purpose of committing a crime 
therein is burglary; killing another for payment frequently is an ag-
gravated form of murder. 4 Indeed, every time an offense defini-
tion contains the phrase "with the purpose to ... , " the law takes 
1. ADL Legal Affairs Department, ADL Law Report: Hate Crimes Statutes: 
A Response to Anti-Semitism, Vandalism, and Violent Bigotry 1 (1988 & Supp. 
1990). 
2. See, e .g., George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 463 (1978); Jerome 
Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 98-99 (2d ed. 194 7). 
3. Webster's Seventh New Collegia te Dictionary 553 (1965). Specialized 
literatures mi ght give it a special meaning, of course. 
4. Most jurisdictions treat thi s no t as an offense element , but as a factor 
relevant to grading, as in the Model Penal Code 's use of " fo r pecuniary gain" as 
an aggravating factor in considering imposition of the death penalty. lvl odel Pe-
nal Code§ 210.6(3)(g) (1985). 
•; 
1: 
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as an offense element the actor's motive, the cause of his or her 
act. 
It is the nature of human conduct that nearly every action is 
performed for a purpose. In nearly every instance there is 
"something that causes a person to act": to steal the television in 
the house broken into, to gain sexual gratification by "flashing" 
another, or to earn the money offered for the killing. And these 
causes of action-these purposes, motives-often are relevant to 
determining how blameworthy an actor is for the action. I will 
leave it to the philosophers to develop a theory as to which mo-
tives ought to be relevant to criminal liability and which ought 
not, but I can give some examples. It commonly would be judged 
less blameworthy to break into a house for a place to sleep than to 
steal the television; less blameworthy to "flash" another in order 
to change one's clothes conveniently than to gain sexual satisfac-
tion; and less blameworthy to kill out of jealousy than for a fee. 
Some motives can reduce an actor's blameworthiness. If an 
actor breaks into a mountain cabin to steal food to save his family 
from starving until rescuers find them, the reason for acting un-
dercuts the actor's blameworthiness. Good motive frequently will 
give rise either to a justification defense or to an excuse defense 
for a mistake as to justification. 
Not all motives are relevant to liability. Every intentional kill-
ing may have a motivational cause, and most are to be con-
demned. But some motives may not significantly increase or 
decrease an actor's blameworthiness from that for the typical in-
tentional killing. Killing out of jealousy, revenge, or anger might 
all be equally condemnable, but none are likely to be as condem-
nable as killing for a fee. 
An actor's motive, such as wanting to steal the television, may 
tell us that the actor desires to cause harm beyond that already 
caused, adding a ground for added inchoate liability. The motiva-
tion may make the act itself seem particularly more offensive to 
us, as in killing for a fee, perhaps because it reveals the act to be 
more calculated than we might otherwise have thought. 
The actor's motive also may tell us something about the ac-
tor's general character. T he motive to steal may suggest greed; 
the ki lling for a fee may suggest an extreme indifference to the 
value of human life. It is not that the law punishes an actor for his 
o r her greed or indifference but, whe n such aspects of character 
are exercised in performance of the offense conduct, they may alter 
our assessment of the blameworthiness of the actor for that 
conduct. 
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To summarize, motive-the cause of an action-frequently is 
an element of liability and grading, and no apparent reason exists 
why it should not be that way. It should alter liability if and only if 
it alters an actor's blameworthiness for the prohibited act. Some 
motives alter our judgments of blameworthiness, others do not; 
distinguishing between the two is the challenge put to criminal 
code drafters. 
Some people might argue that use of motive is unobjection-
able if the motive is to cause an external result. This kind of mo-
tive might even be called an intention. The purpose or motive (or 
intention) of the actor's conduct is to bring about an external 
consequence: to obtain the television or to obtain the fee for the 
killing. More problematic, they might argue, is motive that satis-
fies an internal emotion. 5 I kill my neighbor not because it will 
bring about a desirable external consequence-for instance, he 
will stop attracting my spouse's attention-but because it will 
bring some purely internal satisfaction: revenge for the role he 
played in causing my spouse to leave me long ago. Should the 
criminal law be more suspicious of using such internal-satisfaction 
motives than external-consequence motives? 
This is a question of some importance in the matter of hate 
crimes because some actors may commit such offenses not for the 
harm that they cause to the hated group-e.g., intimidating 
others who identify with the victim-but rather for the internal 
satisfaction that it brings, the satisfaction of their hatred. 
However, the distinction between internal and external goals 
seems tenuous. When the flasher exposes himself, his motive is, 
as the offense details, to satisfy his sexual desire-an internal sat-
isfaction, not an external consequence. His motive is key to defin-
ing the offense, for it excludes from liability the person who 
"flashes" another not to gain sexual satisfaction but simply be-
cause they are late to a meeting that requires a change of clothes. 
There seems little reason to claim that because the motive is an 
internal one, sexual satisfaction, it is an inappropriate element of 
liability. One may wish to dispute whether one internal motive or 
another increases (or decreases) an actor's blame\vorthiness; 
some will while others will not. It would be odd, though, to insist 
that the criminal law can never take account of an internal motive . 
Even where the immediate motive is to cause an external 
consequence , the desire for that external consequence may stem 
5. Fo r a discussion of th e di s tin ction, see Glanvill e Williams , Criminal Law : 
The General Part 48 (2d ed . 1961). 
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from the wish to satisfy an internal desire. The killer for a fee may 
want the money not to provide worldly comforts (he never spends 
it); rather, earning the fee in this way gives him a sense of self-
importance and power. Does it matter to us that his motive is 
such internal satisfaction rather than to acquire external com-
forts? Killing for a fee is particularly repugnant no matter which 
motivation, internal or external, is dominant. Indeed, most of the 
cause-and-effect chains of motive and action ultimately lead to 
satisfaction of an internal desire. The person who breaks into the 
cabin to feed his family has their safety as his immediate concern, 
but why? Perhaps because it makes him feel good to protect his 
loved ones. Should this internal satisfaction disqualify his motive 
as worthy of a mitigation or defense? 
II 
MOTIVE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR CHARACTER 
Rather than leading the criminal law into questionable terri-
tory, motive can be a useful device in keeping the criminal law 
from expanding into such territory, as in imposing liability be-
cause of an actor's character. (By character, I mean an actor's per-
sonal predisposition toward certain kinds of conduct or beliefs: 
honesty, dishonesty, bigotry, tolerance, generosity, stinginess. 
Each says something about a person's internal decision-making 
and suggests how the person is predisposed to act in the future.) 
One could conceive of a world where greed or indifference to 
the value of human life, or other traits of bad character, were 
themselves grounds for criminal liability and punishment. These 
are traits to be condemned. Bad character shows both a moral 
shortcoming in itself and a predisposition toward future antisocial 
conduct. Why wait until the bad character expresses itself in a 
burglary or killing? vVhy not allow proof of bad character itself to 
be adequate to bring to bear the law's power to punish the "of-
fender" and protect the public? 
It may be that some of this kind of thinking lies behind the 
current popularity of hate crimes . Racial, religious, or sexual big-
otry shows bad character that deserves punishment. Such charac-
ter is a form of moral depravity in itself and call s for 
condemnation by the criminal law. If we can identify the hate-
mongers in our society, we can punish them and, in the process, 
publicly reaffirm society's commitment to the virtues of tolerance. 
But this is where traditional criminal law theory ·would have 
some difficulty. Vv' e do not criminalize or punish bad character, of 
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course; the criminal law is reserved for condemning past antiso-
cial conduct for which the actor is to blame. A person's character 
may be an adequate ground for heaven-and-hell judgments by 
religion, but the criminal law restricts itself to punishing at most 
expressions of character through action. 
Sometimes thought of as the act requirement, this basic prin-
ciple has several justifica tions. First, the legal process has a lim-
ited ability to know character except through action. A greedy 
and indifferent person may successfully hide behind lawful acts 
his or her entire life. Second, all except the determinists believe 
that a person has the power to choose how he or she will act at 
any given moment, no matter what his or her character may be. A 
greedy or indifferent person may successfully bring himself to 
overcome that predisposition and to lead a lawful life. And, fi-
nally, few people have a character that is all good or all bad. Even 
the leader of the Ku Klux Klan might contribute his kidney to 
save his daughter. How is the law to punish a person who is good 
in some respects and bad in others? How could the law hope to 
balance a person's good traits against the bad? 
By waiting for action, the criminal law hopes that in each of 
life's decisions an actor may choose to do something different 
than that toward which bad character predisposes. By waiting for 
action, the law justifies punishment upon the actor's choice not to 
act differently than his or her bad character predisposes. That is, 
the criminal law waits to see how, and if, a person's bad character 
will be exercised in bad conduct. 
The conduct may tell us something about the actor and the 
choice that he or she has made. To the extent that the circum-
stances tell us something relevant to blameworthiness, we take ac-
count of that in assessing liability and grade. The motives for 
breaking and entering (to steal the television), or for killing (to 
earn a fee), or for flashing (to get sexual satisfaction), do tell us 
something relevant. By taking account of these motives, the law 
takes account of character in the only way that it properly can if it 
is to maintain its focus upon action. 
This suggests that taking account of motive is consistent with 
the criminal law's requirement that liability wait for conduct. But 
my claim is something more: that the use of motive is an impor-
tan t mechanism for keeping criminal law within the boundary of 
action and out of the zone of liability for bad character. Imagine a 
1.vorld where motive for conduct could not be considered by the 
criminal law, where onlv the ac tion itself could be used as 
I 
grounds for liability. (Assume the ac tor's state of mind as to that 
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present action could be taken into account, whether his action 
was intentional or accidental.) This would, I predict, be seen as a 
sterile creation that was blind to much of what ought to be rele-
vant to liability and punishment. And, with diminishing credibil-
ity in making accurate blameworthiness judgments, such a system 
would be discarded in favor of something that did take account of 
more relevant facts. If motive were not allowed, then the danger 
arises that bad character itself would be used. 
We see this tendency today, as the criminal law substitutes 
predictions of future dangerousness (a claim about the d efen-
dant's character) in place of facts that assess the actor's degree of 
blameworthiness for past conduct. Dangerousness is the ration-
ale and the criterion for special extended terms of incarceration 
for habitual offenders. 6 Under such provisions, an offender may 
be sentenced to life imprisonment for obtaining $120.7 5 by false 
pretenses-for example, upon a showing that he committed two 
previous felonies related to credit card and check fraud. 7 Some 
jurisdictions use dangerousness as the primary criterion for de-
ciding whether consecutive sentences should be imposed for mul-
tiple offenses. A consecutive sentence should be imposed "after a 
finding by the trial judge that confinement for such a term is nec-
essary in order to protect the public from further criminal con-
duct by the defendant. " 8 Dangerousness similarly is the rationale 
and the criterion for extended terms for several classes of offend-
ers, such as those determined to be "sexually dangerous per-
sons. " 9 Under one of these statutes, for example, a sex offender 
6. See, e .g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann§ 13-604(K) (1992); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-
501 (Michie 1987); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4214 (1987); Fla. Stat. ch. 77 5.084 
(1991); Miss . Code Ann. § 99-1 9-83 (1991); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 207.010 
(Michie 1991) ; N.M . Stat. Ann. § 31- 18-1 7 (Mich ie 1990) ; S.D. Codifi ed Laws 
Ann.§§ 22-7-7, 22-7-8 , 22-7-8.1 (1988); \tV. Va. Code § 61-ll-18 (1992); Wyo. 
Stat. § 6-1-110. See also Am. Jur. 2d, Habitual Criminals and Subsequent Of-
fenders ( 1968). 
7. Such sentencing was upheld as constitutional in Rummel v. Este ll e, 445 
U.S. 263 (1980). 
8. Gray v. State, 538 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tenn. 1976) (cit in g Sentencing Al-
ternatives and Procedures, § 3.4(b)(IV), Am erican Bar Assoc iation Proj ect on 
Standards for Criminal Jus tice (1968)). 
9. See, e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 105-1.0 1 et seq. (see Peopl e v. Loven, 
600 N.E.2d 893 (Ill. App. C t. 1992) (unde rl ying convicti on need not be for <1 
sexual offense)) ; Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403.1 (Sup p. 1988); Wis. Stat.§ 975. 12 
(1989-1 990); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-13-203 (1 992). Some jurisdictions achieve 
the same result through judicial decision. See, e .g., State v. Barnes, 818 P.2d 
l 088 ( 1991) (dangerousness as an aggravat ing fac tor in the sentencin g of sex 
offenders). 
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is committed to an indeterminate term, from one day to life im-
prisonment, upon a finding that he "constitutes a threat of bodily 
harm to members of the public." 10 The release decision for such 
offenders similarly is keyed to the dangerousness of the of-
fender.11 Indeed, some jurisdictions allow extended terms for 
nearly any serious felony where the offender is found to be dan-
gerous.12 And many jurisdictions have their parole commissions 
make release decisions for all offenses by assessing inter alia the 
dangerousness of the offender. Typically, an offender may be re-
leased only if such action "will not increase the likelihood of harm 
to the public." 13 
The virtue of taking account of motive is that it helps focus 
the inquiry on the actor's past conduct. It allows the law to con-
sider character-related issues as they concern the actor's blame-
worthiness for his or her action-\Vas this act committed out of 
greed? Does this conduct reflect an indifference to the value of 
human life ?-without allowing the law to slide into an explicit in-
quiry into the actor's character, apart from what is reflected in his 
or her act (such as his potential for future crimes). 14 Note that 
the instances of dangerousness affecting punishment listed above 
10. Colo. Rev . Stat.§ 16-1 3-211(2) (1992). 
11 . The Board is authorized to release a person, "if the board deems it in 
the best interes ts of that pe rson and the public and that the person , if at la rge, 
would not constitute a threat of bodily harm to members of the public." Colo. 
Rev. Stat. § 16-13-216(5) (1992) . 
12. See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat.§§ 16 1.725, 161.735 (1991). 
13. Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann ., art. 42 .18, § 8(a) (Wes t 1993). See also 
Alaska Stat.§ 33 .16 .100 (1986) ; Ark . Code Ann. § 16-93-701 (Michie 1987) (re-
lease when there is a reasonabl e probability that the prisoner can be released 
without detriment to the community) ; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 17-22 .5-404 (1992) 
(the board shall first consider the risk of violence to the public in every re lease 
decision it makes); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 434 7 (1987) (a parole shall be or-
de red only in the bes t interest of society); Fla . Stat. Ann.§ 947.18 (West 1985) 
(no person shall be placed on parole until and unles s the commission finds that 
there is a reasonable probabili ty that , if he is placed on parole, his release will be 
compatible with his own welfare and th e welfare of socie ty); Ky. Rev . Stat. Ann. 
§ 439.340 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985) (a pa roie shall be ordered only fo r the 
bes t interest of socie ty); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 2 17-690 (Vernon 1983) (when, in the 
board's opinion, there is a reasonabie probabili ty that an offender can be re-
leased without detriment to the community, the board may in its discretion re-
lease or parole such person); Mon t. Co de An n. § 46-23 -20 l ( 1) ( 1992) 
(" reasonable probability that the pris oner can be re leased without de triment to 
. .. the community"). 
14. It is not my view that dangerous persons ought to be free from incapa ci-
tation. On the contrary, any viable socie ty must protect itself from da ngerous 
persons in some vvay . My view is, rather, that dangerousness of fur.ure criminal-
ity ough t to be dealt with through cwil rath er than crim inal commi tmen t. See 
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typically exist in the less public aspects of the criminal justice sys-
tem, sentencing and parole. Few, if any, offenses are defined to 
make future dangerousness an element. 
III 
PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING HATE-
MOTIVATION OFFENSES AND THE 
ALTERNAT IVE APPROACH O F 
CRIMES OF GROUP TERROR 
While use of motive jibes with traditional criminal law theory, 
it does not follow that hate-motive is the best means of defining 
crimes of this sort. Some writers have pointed out the potential 
dangers of infringing protected speech in violation of the First 
Amendment. 15 Even if one concludes that some hate-motivation 
formulations might not violate the First Amendment, it is hard to 
feel good about coming so close to the line . 
O ther scholars have suggested serious problems in the draft-
ing and application of hate-motivation offenses.16 How can we 
tell when an offense was in fact motivated by hatred? Even if we 
can show hate motivation , how can we tell whether the hatred is 
for the group or for thi s person in particular, or some combina-
tion of the two? (Presumably, the hatred must be for a character-
istic of the victim that the victim shares with a group.) If some 
combination of ha tred for the group and the individual is requi-
site, what proportion of the hate motivation must be hate for the 
group rather than the individual? Which characteristics-that is, 
which groups-are to be covered by the offense? How are these 
groups to be defined? (What is a "religion" for the purposes of 
Paul H. Robinson , The Criminal-Civil Distinction and Dangerous Blameless O f-
fenders, 83 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 693 ( 1993) . 
15. See, e. g., Susan Gellman , S ticks and Stones Can Put Yo u in Jail, But 
Can Words Increase Your Sentence? Cons titutional and Po licy Dilemmas o f Eth-
nic Intimidation Laws , 39 U.C .L. A. L. Rev. 333 (199 1 ); Susan Gellman , Bro ther , 
You Can't Go to Jail for What 'x'ou' re Thinking: Mo tives, Effe cts, and " H ate 
Crime" Laws, 11 Crim. Jus. Ethi cs 24 (Summer/Fall 1992); l'vlartin Redish , Free-
d o m of T hought as Freedom of Expression: Hate Crime Sen tencing Enhance-
me nt and First Amendment T heory, 11 Crim . Jus. Ethics 29 (Summer/Fall 
1992) . But Wisconsin v. Mitchell , 11 3 S. Ct. 21 94 (1993) , upholds a common 
fo rmula tion of hate crimes , fin d ing th at such statutes merely regula te no n-ex-
p ress ive speech . Unless sta te supreme courts rely upon the ir own constitutions, 
lhe po tential fo r further consti tu tio nal challen ge is limited. 
16. See, e .g., Gellman , supra note 15 (bo th arti cl es); J ames B. Jaco bs, Re-
thin king the War Aga inst Ha te Crimes: A New York City Pe rspec tive , 11 Crim. 
Jus. Ethics 55 (Summer/ Fall 1992) . 
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an offense motivated by hate of the victim's religion? Are some 
sexual offenses necessarily hate crimes against women?) Would it 
be less objectionable to commit a crime against a member of one 
group than against the member of another group, if both crimes 
were motivated by a hatred for the respective groups? On what 
grounds could we punish hate motivation against some groups 
but not others? Is there liability if the offense is motivated by a 
hatred for conservatives? Oil executives? Abortionists? Ameri-
cans? The subjectivity of the judgment, the difficulty of proof, 
and the complexity in identifying the victim groups to be recog-
nized, make laws regarding hate-motivation offenses difficult to 
draft and apply. 
A different approach to criminalizing much of the conduct 
now sought to be covered by hate-motivation crimes is to focus 
upon the greater harm caused and intended by such conduct, 
than would occur in an analogous offense without the hate-moti-
vation. Spray-painting a swastika on a synagogue simply is not 
the same as spray-painting a gang's name on vacant buildings on 
its turf. Both are forms of visual pollution and property damage 
that may offend us, but the former also can hurt and intimidate, in 
a very real way, all of the members of that synagogue and, less 
directly, all Jews who see or hear about it. A greater harm to a 
greater number of people can result, and frequently is intended, 
where the conduct seeks to intimidate or emotionally injure an 
identifiable group, than in instances where the same conduct does 
not target a particular group. 
The cross-burning on an African-American family's front 
yard is more harmful and therefore deserves greater punishment 
than a similar size fire in a different context without the hate 
message. All crime, especially public crime, can hurt and intimi-
date each of us; however, the other African-American families in 
the neighborhood and, to a lesser extent, other blacks who hear 
of the incident can be hurt and intimidated by the burning more 
than they or we are hurt or intimidated by a non-hate-message 
burning. This, of course, is frequently exactly what the offender 
hopes and desires. He or she seeks to send a message of hate and 
an implicit threat to both the immediate victims and to others of 
the same group. By focusing on the additional harms as the basis 
for greater liability, we avoid the hate-motivation application 
problems as well as the potential First Amendment iss ues . 
T aking account of such secondary harms in crim inalizin g and 
grading conduct is no t new. Provisions like Model Penal Code 
section 250.9, for example, criminalize the desecra tion of vener-
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ated objects precisely because of the potential for greater harm 
that such conduct brings. (Consistent with this, the Code classes 
the offense as one against public order and decency rather than as 
an offense against property.) 
The challenge is to draft a statute that will encompass the 
variety of things that people can do to intimidate and emotionally 
injure a group by victimizing one person on the present occasion. 
Perhaps something along the fo llowing lines would be a starting 
point: 
Causing or Risking Group Intimidation or Terror. Any person who 
commits an offense and, by such conduct, purposely or reck-
lessly causes or hopes to cause intimidation or terror in a 
group of persons who identify with the victim [through race, 
religion, gender, or sexual preference], shall be liable for an 
offense under this section. If the person purposely causes or 
hopes to cause such intimidation or terror, the offense is a 
[fourth degree felony]. If the person recklessly causes such 
intimidation or terror, the offense is a [second degree 
misdemeanor]. I 7 
Note that liability could be available under this section even if the 
group were not in fact intimidated or terrorized . Because the 
provision is drafted as a separate offense, an actor can be held 
liable for an unsuccessful attempt to commit the offense. 18 
T here remains the question of how broadly to define the 
groups whose intimidation may trigger the offense. Given the 
soundness of the underlying theory-greater harm deserves 
greater liability-one could have the offense apply to any crime 
that intimidates any larger group, as the draft statute does. In 
practice, the offense would still be used primarily against those 
who seek to intimidate or terrorize the groups that historically 
have been victimized in this way. In this form, however, the of-
fense also could be used to give added punishment fo r efforts to 
intimidate or terrorize any group. For example, it could be used 
against persons who assault attendees at a pro-choice (or pro-life) 
convention in an effort to intimidate or terrorize others at the 
conven tion . On the o ther hand, if the point of the legislation is to 
17. O ffense grades are included not to propose the particular grades; dif-
ferent statutory grades have different meanings in different jurisdictions. The 
point, rather, is to show that purpose and recklessness as to causing intimidation 
or terror in the group might be graded differentlv. 
18. T here may be disagreement over whether the reckless form of the of-
fense can be punished und er an attempt statute. See Paul H. Robinson, A Func-
tional Analysis of Criminal Law, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev.- (forthcoming 1994). 
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make a speciai, symbolic statement in favor of tolerance for diver-
si ty along particular lines-race, religion, sexual preference, to 
name a few-then more limited application may be preferred. 
Nevertheless, this may still raise the choice-of-group problems in-
herent in the application of hate-motivation statutes noted above. 
